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Postcolonial theory has a people problem. By this, I do not mean to suggest those who 
practice, write, or otherwise espouse a postcolonial perspective on cultural affairs are somehow 
difficult, obtuse, or otherwise problematic to deal with in professional settings. Even if this were 
the case, the solution to the deficiencies in postcolonial theory most certainly does not lie in the 
mandatory installation of the Sirius Cybernetics Corporation “Genuine People Personality”  1
software on every humanities department’s server the world over. Rather, I am unabashedly 
suggesting that postcolonial theoreticians’ overemphasis on people as the site of analysis lies at 
the heart of the limitations of the field’s key terms, epistemological boundaries, and approach to 
understanding phenomena as a whole. Indeed, if postcolonial theory and its related concepts and 
methods are to have any intellectual purchase, then it is time to abandon its anthropocentric 
approach to explaining how the world works and suggesting how to right humanity’s wrongs in 
favor of perspectives which acknowledge the solidarity of things and the non-hierarchical nature 
of life.  
Our Anthropocene may mean that we humans are now, more than ever, impacting Earth’s 
geological and environmental processes, although even thinking that humans somehow operate 
distinctly from nature retains a whiff of a people-centric analysis. Equally, and in intellectual 
simultaneity, the fluid definition of postcoloniality reflects the obvious fact the term 
‘postcolonial’ has severe limitations. Loomba rightly situates the very language of postcolonial 
studies, arguing that the word “postcolonial” itself is only useful “with caution and qualification” 
and that if divorced from specific historical circumstances, “postcoloniality cannot be 
meaningfully investigated, and instead, the term begins to obscure the very relations of 
1 ​Adams 95. 
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domination it seeks to uncover.”  In turn, Hardt and Negri see postcolonial thought, particularly 2
Bhabha’s binary-busting mechanism of hybridity, as epiphenomenal of the logics of power and 
Empire.  These critiques point to another obvious fact: the colonial condition has not ended. 3
Colonialism, neo or otherwise, is not simply or even primarily about the oppression of people. 
The colonial project is ontologically materialist in its exploitation of territory through settlement, 
resources through extraction, surplus value through labor, and profit through finance. In other 
words, understanding colonialism means examining exploitive relationships between things; a 
perspective that does not dismiss humans, but certainly dissenters them from the analysis. In the 
same way that Roy suggests that an exclusive focus on human rights is a​ camera obscura ​of 
contemporary conflict which ignores the vital, fundamental importance of territorial 
appropriation and resource extraction,  so too does postcolonial theory distract of a richer 4
understanding and resistance to the colonial project as a whole by focusing on the epiphenomena 
of humanity through concepts such as subalternity, the native informant, Orientalism, and 
hybridity which not only foreclose a complex understanding of human social affairs, but offer a 
nihilistic and narrow reading of life itself.  
Any critique of postcolonial theory is not necessarily a novel one, as even Spivak works 
to suggest the intellectual limits of postcolonialism are bounded and determined by the 
intellectual legacies of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Outside of the field, more substantive critiques on 
the limits of postcolonial theory to adequately explain social phenomena include Eagleton’s 
tongue-in-cheek parsing out of “Postcolonialism and ‘postcolonialism,’” as well as Chibber’s 
2 Loomba 16.  
3 ​Hardt and Negri 145-146.  
4 This reference from this comes from the audiobook of Roy’s ​Capitalism: A Ghost Story ​at the 
50:59 mark of the narration.  
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assessment of the straw assumptions which underpin the Subaltern Studies School’s intellectual 
project.  Interestingly, what unites all three of these disparate, often antagonistic academic’s 5
relationships with each other is a desire to talk and teach our way through the problems posed by 
and the contradictions which emerge as a result of thinking through the postcolonial approach to 
human affairs. These are all well and good, especially if you enjoy reading lines such as: “Vivek 
Chibber is stumped by his desire to ‘correct’ everybody-the examples are altogether too many to 
quote;”  “I will respond as best I can to Gayatri Spivak’s criticisms...though, as I will suggest 6
below, the task is not an easy one owing to Spivak’s peculiar style of engagement;”  and 7
“Spivak’s hankering to say everything at once is not perhaps entirely innocent of a desire to 
impress; but it is a great deal more than that, just as the obscurity of a theorist’s style can 
sometimes signal insecurity quite as much as arrogance.”  Yes, these are emblematic of the type 8
of highfalutin debates that academic culture so often reeks of, especially those occurring inside 
and around postcolonial theory. But these tactics of intellectual long-ball football will only 
continue, and thus remain of limited value, if the discursive pitch of postcolonial theory remains 
an exclusively anthropocentric affair.  
The Problem of People (or, Kant we Hegel our way out of this?) 
Spivak is right to suggest that some of the limits of postcolonial reasoning stem from 
theorists’ adherence to the frameworks set up by Enlightenment thinkers. Kant is of particular 
interest insofar that he sets up the challenge of observing the world in which we inhabit by 
posting that our observations  of ourselves and anything else for that matter depend on an 
5 ​Warren 15-28. 
6 ​Spivak “Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital,” 73.  
7 Chibber “Making Sense of Postcolonial Theory,” 91. 
8 ​Eagleton “In the Gaudy Supermarket.”  
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‘outside’ and an ‘inside’; the latter being ourselves which can only be apprehended because we 
can reason about what we are not. This is what Morton and others who fall under the rather fuzzy 
banner of Object Oriented Ontology and the Speculative Realism school of philosophy name as 
the problem of correlationism.  Simply put, there is the ‘thing’ and the information about the 9
‘thing’ which we ascribe, intuit, connect, or otherwise correlate to the thing. Our awareness of 
any‘thing’ is bounded by our ability to perceive it and absent of our inscription, it does not exist. 
Such inside/outside thinking is at the heart of Kantian logic for how we explain human 
self-awareness and observation, but it is also a logic which falsely sets up a dichotomy between 
the self and an Other. Equally damaging, this logic assumes that things, including ourselves, only 
exist when we observe them, even though the inscription we use will always be flawed, 
incomplete, or subject to deconstruction. Hegel extends and amplifies this anthropocentric 
divorce of things from each other in his lordship and bondage dialectic in which the Other is not 
only a scheme for establishing a self-identity, but also as a mechanism for control and imposition 
over anyone or anything that is not the self. These are simplistic recitations of rather nuanced and 
complex ideas for sure; my point is that these metonymic exercises of working through different 
means of self-actualization not only forecloses other types of knowledge structures about 
humans--Spivak’s general point --but also severely limits thinking about life in general by 
privileging humans and their experiences over that of anything else. If colonization is the act of 
appropriating or exploiting a domain or thing outside of ourselves for selfish gains, then 
colonization begins in our intellectual appropriation, rather than appreciation, of life itself.  
9 ​Morton 7-10.  
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Anthropocentric thinking emerges in the precursors and foundational work of 
postcolonial thought. Cesaire, Du Bois, Fanon, and Memmi all root their analysis of colonial 
conditions in varying degrees of psychoanalytic thinking. Indeed, it is the emergence, power, and 
durability of Freudian, Lacanian, and Jungian schools of analysis which not only directly 
impacted early postcolonial theorists ---Fanon, for example, was trained as a psychologist --but 
speak to what has become an emblematic feature of the humanities; the conceptual and 
theoretical borrowing from other intellectual disciplines in order to find novel ways to study 
humans. Digressing into the various critiques of each of these psychological schools would be 
beside the point at this juncture, although there is something delicious in thinking about Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as, “a capitalist disorder.”  Rather, the fact that postcolonial theory latched onto 10
and then extended ideas which were oriented exclusively towards thinking about people, and 
oppressed people, in particular, was the first act in narrowing the aperture of postcolonial thought 
for the remainder of the century. This is in no way surprising, for psychoanalysis may be an 
emancipatory schema committed to freeing, “human beings from what frustrates their fulfillment 
and well being.”  Liberating oneself from slavery, servitude, or the precariat class under the 11
weight of colonialism certainly seems like a worthwhile endeavor for psychoanalytic thinking. 
For example, Cesaire may root his work in Marxist analysis, however, the language Cesaire 
employs, “First we must study how colonization works to ​decivilize ​the colonizer, to ​brutalize 
him in the truest sense of the word.” is nothing short of anthropocentric in nature.  Cesaire’s 12
suggestion that “no one colonizes innocently,”  is an apt rebuttal to attempts to negate human 13
10 ​Deleuze and Guattari’s ​Anti-Oedipus​. Quoted in Crews 176.  
11 ​Eaglton ​Literary Theory​ 166.  
12 ​Cesaire 35.  
13 ​Cesaire 39.  
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complicity in colonization --perhaps an earlier, more poetic version of Goldhagen’s provocative 
thesis on ‘ordinary’ Germans during the Second World War.  While Cesaire works to frame 
colonialism in economically imperial terms, far more so than Du Bois, Fannon, and Memmi do, 
Cesaire’s argument about both mental states of colonizer and colonized, the latter often 
dehumanized ​(my emphasis) through the racial component of colonialism, reaffirms that he sees 
the colonial project as one that lies exclusively in the world of human affairs. In the same vein, 
Memmi articulates his analysis of colonialism in wonderfully parsimonious terms, “the best 
possible definition of a colony: a place where one earns more and spends less.”  Memmi spends 14
chapter after chapter working through the positionality of the hypothetical colonizer and 
colonized person, looking to unpack the relationship between these protagonists, intertwined in 
the tragedy of colonialism. Memmi invokes adjectives such as “disfigurement,”  “annihilation,”15
  and ”liberation”  to describe the personal outcomes of this relationship. Memmi hints at a 16 17
broader understanding of the colonial frame, but then pulls back towards his exclusively human 
analysis, “Colonization is, above all, economic and political exploitation. If the colonized is 
eliminated, the colony becomes a country like any other, and who then will be exploited?”  18
Finally, and as if to put one more away goal in for Anthropocentric Colonialism F.C., Memmi 
writes that the human free of colonialism, “will be a whole and free man.”  19
Landscapes, flora, and fauna are curiously absent from both Cesaire’s and Memmi’s 
analysis, so too are finance, markets, and machines, the engines of the capitalist colonial project. 
14 ​Memmi 4.  
15 ​Memmi 147.  
16 ​Memmi 151.  
17 ​Memmi 152.  
18 ​Memmi 149.  
19 ​Memmi 153.  
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French imperial control over Martinique and Tunisia, respectively was not exclusively about the 
control and exploitation of the local population. Ports in Forte-de-France and Tunis and the 
shipping lanes which connected these colonial entities to the wider Francophone colonial system 
and modern capitalist world system undoubtedly impacted the environs that Cesaire and Memmi 
were so passionate about liberating. Rail lines from Tunis stretch outward toward mines and oil 
fields across northern Africa, linking further on to the extraction of timber, rubber, and ivory 
from the heart of the continent. Territory, homes, waterways, mammals, libraries, 
communication networks; all were occupied and exploited by French colonial capitalism. Yes, 
the colonial condition for the locals in Martinique and Tunisia were deplorable, but both 
Cesaire’s and Memmi’s reading of and solution to the colonial condition is suspiciously 
one-sided. Where is the critique of the French colonial system’s brutalization of the pastoral? 
Where is the overt, detailed accounting of how the expansion of capitalism from the French core 
to the Caribbean and North African periphery exploited all aspects of life, not just the local 
population of bipedal hominids? Flipping the script slightly, is it simply the colonial mindset, 
and not the literal tools of the trade in the form of flotilla and firearms, which implicate 
themselves in the colonization of people, places, and everything else in the space? The 
imposition of the Francophone educational system did not simply colonize locals’ school 
experiences or knowledge structures; books, buildings, and budgets all became ripe for the 
picking at the hands of French imperialists. Both Cesaire and Memmi are rather silent on these 
issues, and yet exploitation of all things --not simply humans --is at the heart of the colonial 
project. By failing to fully develop a critique of colonialism beyond the exploitation of humans, 
thereby privileging one type of object over another, Cesaire and Memmi set the stage for an 
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anthropocentric reading of postcolonial thought which inevitably comes to misread the 
proliferation and durability of colonialism to the present day.  
The anthropocentrist nature of postcolonial thought is perhaps best exemplified in the 
auto-theory of both Du Bois and Fanon. This is not to suggest that Memmi and Cesaire also 
don’t engage in this sort of psychological construction of theory, again an example of where the 
postcolonial canon borrows from a range of hermeneutic perspectives, but Du Bois and Fanon 
are perhaps more militant and persuasive in their incorporation of personal experience into their 
theoretical formulations. Du Bois articulates the concept of double consciousness as, “a peculiar 
sensation...this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring 
one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”  Du Bois analysis 20
is not only the logical extension of his study of and training in Hegelian philosophy; it is a 
profound way of articulating the positionality of not simply African Americans suffering under 
the yoke of slavery and white supremacy --hallmarks of the colonialism --apply to all oppressed 
peoples the world over. For obvious and perfectly legitimate reasons, Du Bois’ analysis 
privileges the state of humanity, or better yet, the notion that overcoming racism works to 
re-humanize those who have been Othered by colonial process, places, and agents. In a similar 
vein, Fanon’s work is to rehumanize the racialized construction of blackness in the face of white 
supremacy, “I start suffering from not being a white man insofar as the white man discriminates 
against me; turns me into a colonzes subject; robs me of any value or originality; tells me I am a 
parasite in the world, that I should toe the line of the white world as quickly as possible , and that 
we are brute beasts, that we are walking manure, a hideous forerunner of tender cane and silky 
20 ​Du Bois 5. 
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cotton, that I have no place in this world.”  For Fanon, the task of his critique is to expose the 21
ways in which the racism that is inherent to colonialism makes him something other than a 
human, “I am an object among other objects.”  But what if we all are objects? What if, rather 22
than setting up human-centric hierarchies, we think about the structures and impact of all objects 
within particular systems? Again, the nuance of my argument here is not that Du Bois or Fanon’s 
ideas aren’t rightly born out of the intense desire to overturn the nexus of white supremacist 
capitalist colonialism. However, by framing their opposition to colonialism as a project of 
rehumanization all four of the aforementioned thinkers close off broader, more accurate ways of 
reading and resisting colonialism --the exploitation of things, not exclusively people --by 
privileging human existence over those very beasts, which like them, are abused under 
colonization. Read differently, the point of postcolonial criticism and action should not only be 
one of ending the exploitation of humans, but exploitation writ large; an argument that is sorely 
absent from postcolonialist theory and praxis because of the anthropocentric nature of their 
intellectual project.  
Kant to Hegel to Du Bois to Cesaire to Fanon to Memmi: a postcolonial intellectual 
counter attack of triangular passes and anthropocentric logic of self-centered human inquiry 
which forecloses other ways of knowing and thus ends up losing possession in the final third. 
The question is, what other options were available to anti-colonial intellectuals in the early part 
of the 20th-century that would have allowed for a more robust postcolonial praxis beyond that of 
psychological critiques? While it is easy to levy critiques against postcolonialism’s myopic foci 
from the safety of the early 21st century now that many of the matches of national liberation 
21 Fanon 78.  
22 ​Fanon 89.  
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have been played out, doing so would reek of Monday morning commentary. So no 
environmental criticism, no truly developed theories of nationalism, not even World Systems 
Theory. But we do have ​imperialism​, a materialist-based, not-exclusively anthropocentric way of 
understanding and resisting colonial logics that was available to mid- and late-20th century 
postcolonial thinkers. Indeed, it is curious to ponder why ideas which were so widely in 
circulation seem completely absent from this postcolonial perspective. Hobson’s turn of the 20th 
century analysis of imperialism as the natural extension of capitalist logic beyond the borders of 
the nation state not only accurately diagnose the problem of imperialism, but also frame 
solutions to avoiding colonial logics through capital controls and domestic reinvestment. 
Hobson’s study is an assessment of both the human and non-human aspects of colonialism, one 
that rightly sees exploitation in broad terms beyond that of the individual. So influential was 
Hobson’s thesis that Lenin built and expanded on these ideas for his most prominent of 
publications, ​Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. ​Synthesizing Hobson and Marx and 
Engels, Lenin sees financial capital, a non-human object, as the driver of colonialism, one that 
produces the incentives for imperial policies, extractive economies, and the offshoring of class 
conflict, the latter being remarkably similar to Memmi’s definition of colonialism. As with much 
of Marxist influence in the postwar period,  Hobson and Lenin-based understandings of 23
imperialism serve to inform anti-imperial praxis in Latin America, from overtly Marxian 
political and cultural analyses  to pedagogy,  to liberation theology. So too can the legacy of 24 25
Hobson and Lenin be found at the heart of World Systems Theory and in particular, Hardt and 
23 ​See especially Chapters 13 and 14 in Hobsbawm.  
24 For example, see Morana, Dussel, and Jauregui.  
25 ​Freire 1970.  
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Negri’s profoundly influential ​Empire. ​Each of these analysis not only avoids the personal and 
psychoanalytic approach to critiquing the colonial condition, they are overtly solidarist and at 
least are open to, if not outright considerate of, their treatment of human and non-human things.  
Hobson and Lenin are nowhere to be found in the analyses of the psychoanalytic 
approach to postcolonial thought, even though Hobson’s (in English) and Lenin’s (published in 
English in 1939) work predate and were available to Cesaire, Fanon, and Memmi. But let’s not 
simply hold these three accountable on their own; their reasons for missing Hobson and Lenin 
are likely unknowable. Where are Hobson and Lenin, and the study of imperialism in general, in 
the intellectual history of postcolonialism? Gandhi offers no analysis of either Hobson or Lenin 
and frames imperialism as “Western Nationalism;”  a curious connotation as national liberation 26
and nationalism are the some of the very solutions postcolonialists espouse towards countering 
logics of imperialism. Indeed nationalism(s) is a key blind spot for postcolonial thought. Loomba 
is also silent on Hobson, dedicates less than a page to Lenin  in context with situating the term 27
‘imperialism’ itself, and dedicates a mere six pages  in her entire volume to the concept. Even 28
the inexorable Spivak avoids Hobson entirely, and only discusses Lenin as an apologist for state 
power.  Spivak does dedicate pages of prose and footnotes towards imperialism, although much 29
of this comes in the form of her “unquiet ghosts” on the subject.  Said reserves a single line for 30
Hobson, “For imperialists like Balfour, or for anti-imperialists like J.A. Hobson, the Oriental, 
like the African, is a member of a subject race and not exclusively an inhabitant of a 
26 ​Gandhi 195.  
27 ​Loomba 10-11.  
28 ​Loomba 256. 
29 ​Spivak ​A Critique of Postcolonial Reason​, 83. 
30 ​Eagleton “In the Gaudy Supermarket.”  
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geographical area;”  not a very appreciative characterization at all. Lenin escapes Said’s sting 31
insofar as he does not appear at all in Said’s seminal work. Imperialism features in Said’s 
Orientalism​ of course, but Said frames it largely as a Western construct, rather than a capitalist 
one. Perhaps this is a reason --there is never ‘the’ reason --why Hobson, Lenin, and imperialism 
never gain any traction in postcolonial conversations. Chakrabarty , Said, and Spivak  all to 32 33
varying degrees but still in tacit agreement, see Western intellectual constructs as part and parcel 
of the project of colonialism. A worthwhile critique to acknowledge for sure, but as Chibber 
demonstrates, these authors as well as those associated with the Subaltern Studies School rely on 
these very same Western --read Enlightenment --ways of knowing to produce and sustain their 
claims.   34
Can postcolonial thinkers ‘Hegel’ their way out of the trap of personhood they have 
created for themselves? Such a move would be difficult, as the concept of the Other, the 
subaltern, and the native informant are central to their psychoanalytic hermeneutics and their 
devoutly anthropocentric ontology. Focusing on personhood is a central pillar of postcolonial 
thought, as the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment shapes the way we have prioritized our 
politics; both postcolonialists and the rest of us, even if the former is uncomfortable with the 
idea. Abandoning Hegelian notions of the Self and the Other ‘Kant’ be done unless we are 
willing to reconsider humanity’s relationship to life writ large, a perspective that finds its home 
most prominently in environmental studies.  This does not mean colonizing non-Western, 35
31 ​Said 92.  
32 ​Chakrabarty ​Provincializing Europe​.  
33 ​Spivak “Can the Subaltern Speak?”  
34 ​Chibber, ​Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital. 
35 ​See Cronon, especially Chapter 1.  
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indigenous, or other ways of knowing in order to recapture some lost intellectual framework, 
although acknowledging these cosmologies is undoubtedly the right thing to do. Rather, rejecting 
anthropocentrism means circling around some of those pesky European thinkers whose ideas 
spread along side postcolonial theory’s other people problem, that of identity.  
There Is No ‘Post’ in Postcolonial  
What are the goals of postcolonial thought? One likely answer comes in the identification 
of the impact on the psyche and society of those people who suffer under the weight of the 
colonial project. A second is a means of demonstrating how human knowledge and the 
institutions it produces has been constructed to produce racist, gendered, and other exploitive 
architectures to justify and sustain patterns of oppression. A third likely occurs around 
communicating the stories of humans prior to contact and colonization, their collective trauma 
and resistance to occupation, so that they may liberate themselves to live in freedom, however 
that concept is understood in particular cultural conjunctures. What unites these goals are both 
their clear anthropocentric character --no thinker in the postcolonial canon really talks about 
liberating forests from colonial clear-cutting practices or the disappearance of oceanic fish stocks 
--and their aims of shifting the locus of analysis from inside the minds of characters in the 
colonial drama to the always-human subject positions and collectivities which play out in social 
and cultural life. 
Concerns about the colonization of humans were rightly on the minds of postcolonial 
thinkers during the 20th century. Roughly one-third of all humans alive at the middle of the 20th 
century lived in non-self governing territories; diplomatic speak for a colony, a mandate, a 
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protectorate, or some other entity which lacked state sovereignty.  The onset of the Cold War, 36
the withdrawal from imperial possessions as the global balance of state power shifted, the onset 
of wars of national liberation, and the politics of various United Nations organs, and the 
proliferation of capitalism all worked to create a context for seeing the value of changing the 
dynamics of political colonization around the world. For postcolonial academics, whose 
published work came to the party a full generation  after the formal processes of political 37
decolonization began, their concerns centered largely on cultural interpretations of identity. This 
work is done to not only voice, explain and lay blame in the history of colonial relations, but also 
to point towards ways in which colonial logics, in varying degrees of Derridean-ness, can be 
deconstructed. Yet this sort of postcolonial analysis fails to acknowledge that while the UN 
Trusteeship Council suspended their work in 1994, signaling the end of normal time in the 
political imperialism cup final, the match continues to play out in a macabre Fergie time of 
settler colonialism, one where there is no final whistle to limit or constrain the Empire class from 
putting more points on the board.  
Anthropocentrism lies at the heart of postcolonial thinking about identity. Spivak’s 
conception of the subaltern is a way of thinking through how to name and amplify individual and 
collective identities under colonization. Spivak’s argument that, “The subaltern as female cannot 
be heard of read”  has its own problems, as stories of and by these very women exist, for 38
36 ​The United Nations and Decolonization: History. 
37 ​Eagleton 204-206. See also Google Ngram of works on ”postcolonial,” published in English, 
between 1945 and 2017, 
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=postcolonial&year_start=1945&year_end=201
7&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Cpostcolonial%3B%2Cc0  
38 ​Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 104.  
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example, in ​testimonio​ literature the world over.  Spivak perhaps acknowledges her shortcoming 39
with the intervention of the native informant concept--the human tasked with speaking on behalf 
of their culture under colonization --but just like Led Zeppelin’s classic 1973 concert, the 
(anthropocentric) song remains the same. Refuting Spivak’s claim is not my point; rather, 
Spivak’s conception of the subaltern, borrowed from Gramsci, or that of the native informant is 
emblematic of postcolonialism thinkers’ intense focus on the human subject position which 
works to foreclose an acknowledgment of other forms of exploitation. The very notion of 
speaking, and the silencing that Spivak sees as a part of the imperial project, presumes that 
human communication is the only form of dialogue worth acknowledging or even apprehending.  
A more expansive consideration of the subaltern and native informant would be to circle 
back to Gramsci and build on his original conception of the subaltern as the politics and activity 
of marginalized social groups.  Social action is not the exclusive domain of humans, yet for 40
some reason, postcolonial theorists write and speak as if this is the case. The most obvious 
example of non-human social action comes from the biosphere, where ants and aardvarks to 
zooplankton and zebras and all points in between engage in various forms of social activity. This 
sort of non-hierarchical, non-anthropocentric thinking opens up ways of seeing the true totality 
of colonialism, not simply that imposed on clothes-wearing hominids. In other words, by 
acknowledging that colonization is the exploitation of things outside of ourselves, and that 
humans are not exclusively on the wrong end of the colonial spear, it becomes painfully clear 
that colonialism is an ongoing process, not something that we are past or even fully informed by 
at this juncture in the history of the planet.  
39 ​For example, see ​I, Rigoberta Menchu. 
40 ​Green 288.  
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Spivak and Bhabha’s work on identity both suffer from the same problem of 
anthropocentrism, even though they operate at different ends of a continuum of identity. 
Whereas Spivak wants us to hear and see those who are obscured by colonialism, Bhabha claims 
that these folks are already visible, we’re just looking in the wrong places. For Bhabha, an 
individual's identity is a hybrid of their cultural condition, one that is shaped and informed by the 
long arc of colonialism. For Bhabha, there is no Other in a binary sense, only individuals and 
groups operating in third spaces between reified conceptions of colonizer and colonized. These 
liminal locales may be sites of oppression or cosmopolitanism, as evidenced both by Rushdie’s 
Saleem Sinai character in ​Midnight’s Children ​as well as Rushdie’s lived experience. However, 
if hybridity does the work to deconstruct binaries between self and other, colonizer and 
colonized, why can’t it also work to disrupt human and non-human distinctions? If hybridity is as 
much about presence, spatial relations, and culture, does it have to be just about humans? Bhabha 
makes no mention of non-humans, but like the subaltern, the concept itself is ripe to be recast in 
non-anthropocentric terms. The slums of Kibera are probably spaces where Bhabha would find 
hybrid cultures and identities that have been informed by the British colonial experience, so why 
not the wildlife reserves and parks established by the British East Africa Protectorate?  These 41
parks are certainly cosmopolitan, home to a wider variety of species and identities than can be 
found even in the capitalist-core cities of London or New York. Kenyan national parks 
undoubtedly reflect a legacy of colonialism, including the exercise of colonial power, intervenes 
in culture of those who inhabit those spaces if culture is ordinary, learned and lived experiences.
 Bhabha has no answer to this, and I have nothing more than a speculative query. My point, 42
41 ​Chongwa 39-40.  
42 ​Williams 4-5.  
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rather belabored by now I’m sure, is that these core concepts of postcolonial thought are rooted 
in an anthropocentric reading of life in a way that obscures the nature and our understanding of 
colonial exploitation.  
Thinking about colonialism in an non-anthropocentric way thus becomes the access point 
for scholarship on biocolonialism, environmental racism, and speciesism.  This perspective is 43
but one way of rescuing the concepts of the subaltern, the native informant, and hybridity. 
Animals, in parallel to Spivak’s reading of the term, cannot speak or be heard. Individuals, or 
better yet animals themselves can, in turn, speak on behalf of non-human objects from their own 
cultural perspective; we simply have to listen. Hybrid locations and cultures can be remapped to 
acknowledge the existence of non-human actants in these spaces. There are problems with this 
line of reasoning for sure, cultural appropriation perhaps the most prominent one, yet questions 
of who has the authorial power to speak on behalf of something else don’t simply emerge when 
we are analyzing the colonization of non-humans; the critique is part and parcel to cultural 
studies as a whole. Rather, decentering humans from colonial studies means acknowledging that 
the colonization of non-humans occur in similar and different ways than those of us who work in 
academia generally recognize. Taking this logic further, and to be fair I am troubled by some of 
the speculative work around a polity of things, Bennett and fellow vibrant materialists 
understand social action and agency by exploring the assemblages of actants in particular 
contexts.  In other words, one can apprehend colonial conditions by acknowledging the agency 44
and influence of all types of objects which come into existence in response to some sort of 
problem or trauma. Morton and other Object Oriented Ontologists would likely quibble about 
43 Huggan and Tiffin 4-11.  
44 ​Bennett, see especially Chapter 2.  
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Bennett’s notion of the origin of things, but the point here is that inquiry into colonialism need 
not be, nor never should it ever have been, exclusively about humans. Some of the more 
intriguing work in this area lies at the forefront of energy humanities  and petroculture studies,  45 46
where by access to or in pursuit of fossil fuels enables colonial action and where energy itself 
exerts agency and structures relationships between all varieties of objects. A further application 
of a non-anthropocentric approach to colonial studies is likely found in the fields of medical 
humanities and disability studies; areas which I am curious about but woefully novitate to 
discuss in specific detail. Both Morton and Bennett likely have much to say about the 
relationships of objects, and the impact that colonial exploitation informs their interactions, when 
thinking about actants such as patients, assistive devices, and professional qualifications in 
various medical or educational assemblages. In sum, colonialism remains alive and well, even if 
humans claim to have abandoned colonialism, because the concomitant exploitation of 
colonization occurs with and without humans. Writing these thoughts in the centenary of the 
October Revolution, it is worth revisiting Lenin in order to ask ​what is to be done? ​about the 
nature and future of postcolonial studies.  
While there is no end to the colonial project, at least in the near term, there must be an 
end to my argument. There are other, perhaps more worthy critiques of postcolonial thinking 
than I have outlined here. The endurance of settler colonialism on indigenous spaces life is 
perhaps the most heartbreaking critique of the limits of postcolonial intellectual project, 
especially as the rise of postcolonial thought in the 1990s was wrapped up in thinking about 
emerging identities and nationalism at the end of the Cold War and not about the continued 
45 ​Imre and Boyer.  
46 ​Wilson, Carlson, and Szeman.  
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occupation and oppression of indigenous peoples under Empire. The problem of nationalism, the 
Janus-face of postcolonial thought, also works to limit the utility of contemporary postcolonial 
thinking, as national liberation ascribes both a vector for overturning European colonialism, but 
also a means of sustaining colonialism and oppression through Empire, settler colonialism, or 
blatant imperial capitalism.  The problem of anthropocentric thinking may be a nuanced and 47
somewhat troubling issue to work through. After all, postcolonial thought roots itself in the 
humanities and the social sciences where we primarily, if not exclusively, study human affairs. 
Yet as I have hopefully argued to some reasonable extent, human-centric thinking has neither 
resolved the problems of colonialism nor provided fully accurate accounts of the phenomena in 
the first place. Anthropocentrism blinds our analytical view to see problems in purely human 
terms, both in their causes and their effects. Decentering, and not discarding humans, from our 
analysis of exploitation opens up more comprehensive ways of reading the dilemmas that are 
before us. None of this is easy, either intellectually or practically. Yet if humanities scholars and 
teachers are truly interested in addressing issues of ethics and justice, disrupting locations and 
the exercise of power and exploitation, then our first acts should be to selflessly acknowledge 
that thinking exclusively about humans --from our philosophical, economic, and political models 
to our analyses and critiques of current and future conditions --may in itself be the problem. Put 
another way: if one is truly interested in overturning the colonial project, then it is worth naming 
all of the ways in which such exploitation exists and work, even in small ways, to end imperial 
interventions into life. We must do better than we have done so far.  
47 ​Much of Roy’s main thrust in ​Capitalism: A Ghost Story​ covers all three of these perspectives.  
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